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Abstract
This paper analyses the methodology developed by Behrens and Murata (2007)
to introduce variable mark-ups into models of monopolistic competition. Their risk-
aversion explanation to the presence of fixed mark-ups in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
model is validated; however, we show that their constant absolute risk aversion solution
ignores existing mechanisms found in the new Keynesian literature. From these we
develop a model of new economic geography with a variable elasticity of substitution
and variable mark-ups consistent with Behrens and Murata (2007). However, we argue
that from both a theoretical and empirical perspective this new Keynesian approach is
preferable to the solution of Behrens and Murata (2007).
JEL classification: D43; F12; L13; R12; R13.
Keywords: New economic geography; Variable mark-ups; Monopolistic competition;
Flexible varieties aggregator.
1 Introduction
A well-known property of the standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model of
monopolistic competition developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) is that it displays constant
mark-ups regardless of the number of firms competing. Within new economic geography
(NEG), where the Dixit-Stiglitz approach is very popular, this is remarked upon by Krugman
(1998):
“The assumed symmetry amongst varieties and the resulting absence [...] of
any strategic behaviour by firms means that Dixit-Stiglitz undoubtedly misses
much of what really happens in imperfectly competitive industries”
The general intuition behind such models of monopolistic competition is that in the
presence of a preference for variety, product differentiation offers the possibility for firms
to protect their market power from competitors. However, a mark-up that is independent
from an increase in the number of competitors implies that the protection offered by in-
creased product differentiation perfectly offsets the increased competition. As emphasised
by Behrens and Murata (2007), this is a very strong assumption, and one that is unlikely to
be observed in practice. This problem is therefore of particular importance in NEG. Typ-
ically, mark-ups and pricing policies are predicted to be independent both of the number
of producers and their location. Empirically, however, in the presence of agglomeration one
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could expect mark-ups to exhibit some sort of spatial structure, or equivalently one could
expect to see pricing-to-market behaviour from firms.
Behrens and Murata (2007) address this issue by developing a model of monopolistic com-
petition which incorporates pro-competitive effects, including a competitive limit whereby
marginal cost pricing occurs when the firm mass tends to infinity. It is important to empha-
sise from the start that the arguments they raise concerning the limits of the CES case are
valid, and the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) approach they propose provides a
tractable way of getting around this problem. Using this approach, they evaluate in Behrens
and Murata (2006) the welfare aspects of the CARA approach by comparing the autarky
and free trade equilibria of the model.
While the premise of Behrens and Murata (2007) is correct, the solution suggested gen-
erally ignores the existing monopolistic competition literature that is based on quasi-linear
utility functions, typically Ottaviano et al. (2002) and more recently Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), which additionally integrates heterogeneous firms. More importantly from the point
of view of NEG, Behrens and Murata (2007) also ignores the flexible varieties aggregator de-
veloped in Kimball (1995), which builds a simple and elegant extension to Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) that exhibits a variable elasticity of substitution (VES). Dotsey and King (2005) and
Sbordone (2007) in particular provide a good illustration of how this framework can be used
to incorporate pro-competitive effects in the CES framework of Calvo (1983).1
This paper shows that in a similar manner, the Kimball (1995) flexible varieties aggre-
gator can be used to generate pro-competitive effects and variable mark-ups in a simple
extension of standard CES NEG models. Furthermore, it will be argued that the resulting
modeling approach is better suited for NEG than the Behrens and Murata (2007) approach,
and possibly the quasi-linear utility models mentioned above. This is because it provides
pro-competitive equilibrium and welfare predictions that are in line with Behrens and Mu-
rata (2006) while still nesting the benchmark Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) NEG model.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the Kimball
(1995) aggregator, in particular the use of an implicit definition of the manufacturing ag-
gregate and adapts it to the typical NEG specification. This section shows, in agreement
with Behrens and Murata (2007), the link between the elasticity of demand, mark-ups and
risk aversion in such a model. The complete derivation of the VES NEG model as well as
the welfare aspects of autarky and free trade are presented in section 3. Finally, section 4
concludes.
1Sbordone (2007) probably provides the best mathematical exposition of the Kimball (1995) framework,
as well as illustrations of its properties.
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2 Adapting the flexible variety aggregator to NEG
2.1 Utility maximisation
The spatial model developed here assumes an arbitrary finite number of regions, the home
region being denoted by subscript i and the j subscript representing any of the foreign
regions. Hence, for a flow of manufacturing output mi,j (h), the first subscript indicates the
region of production and the second on the region of consumption. Similarly, τi,j ≥ 1 is the
iceberg transport cost incurred in shipping the manufacturing good from the home region to
the target region. As is standard in the NEG literature, it is assumed that transport within
a region is costless, i.e. τi,i = 1.
Agents are assumed to have the same preferences in all regions, and consume manufac-
turing goods only. Their utility function is therefore defined over a manufacturing aggregate
Mi with price index Gi, and regional expenditure is equal to the wage bill. The overall
utility maximisation problem is given by:
 max Ui =Mis.t. MiGi = wiLi (1)
Following the methodology developed by Kimball (1995), the manufacturing aggregate
Mi is implicity defined by the following integral. ϕ (x) is a sub-utility function that is
assumed to be a strictly increasing, concave function, with ϕ (0) = 0. The implicit definition
of Mi is a particularity of Kimball (1995), however it does not change the discussion of the
properties of the sub-utility function ϕ (x) presented in Behrens and Murata (2007). The
star subscript in the manufacturing flow indicates that the integral sums all N varieties h
consumed in region i, regardless of the region of production:2
N∫
0
ϕ
(
m∗,i (h)
Mi
)
dh = 1 (2)
Manufacturing expenditure in region i is simply the integral sum of expenditure per
variety, defined over the continuum of varieties.
MiGi =
N∫
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,im∗,i (h) dh (3)
As explained in Fujita et al. (1999), in this kind of NEGmodel the sub-utility problem can
be solved separately from the overall utility maximisation. Indeed, regardless of the amount
2The star subscript is introduced in the integral sums and summations to emphasise situations where the
summation over varieties or regions does not depend on the origin region of the flow.
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of the aggregate M consumed, maximising overall utility involves choosing a composition of
varieties within the aggregate that minimises manufacturing expenditure. In this respect the
utility problem (1) determines the optimal amount of the manufacturing aggregate regardless
of its actual composition. The solution to (1) is trivial:
Mi =
wiLi
Gi
(4)
It is important to note that this is also the indirect utility function in region i, which
will be useful for the welfare analysis in section 3. The separable sub-utility problem in-
volves choosing a combination of manufacturing varieties that minimises the manufacturing
expenditure MiGi, regardless of the overall amount actually spend on manufactures.

min
N∫
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,im∗,i (h) dh
s.t.
N∫
0
ϕ
(
m∗,i(h)
Mi
)
dh = 1
(5)
Using (3) one obtains the following Lagrangian and first order condition:
Λi =
N∫
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,im∗,i (h) dh− λ
 N∫
0
ϕ
(
m∗,i (h)
Mi
)
dh− 1

pi,j (h) τi,j =
λ
Mj
ϕ′
(
mi,j (h)
Mj
)
(6)
The first order condition (6) can be inverted to determine the compensated demand for a
variety consumed in region i. In terms of notation, the −1 superscript indicates the inverse
function.
si,j (h) =
mi,j (h)
Mj
= ϕ′−1
(
pi,j (h) τi,j
P˜j
)
(7)
Where si,j (h) is defined as the share of a variety h, produced in region i, in the man-
ufacturing aggregate of a target region j. Equation (7) also assumes the existence of a
compositional price index P˜i :
P˜i =
λ
Mi
(8)
This second price index P˜i is a particularity of the Kimball (1995) flexible variety aggre-
gator. It is important to point out that it is generally different from the Gi manufacturing
price index of standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) NEG models. P˜i is used to determine the
optimal composition of the manufacturing aggregate. This can be seen in (7), where ϕ′−1
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maps the price of a variety relative to P˜j to its share in the aggregate Mj . The manu-
facturing price index Gi on the other hand, gives the cost of a unit of the manufacturing
aggregate, which is visible in equation (3). In the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator the
manufacturing price index Gi fulfills both of these functions.
Equation (8) defines P˜i using the lagrangian multiplier, however once a specific functional
form is chosen for ϕ(x), a full specification of this price index can be obtained by replacing
the first order condition (6) into the implicit equation (2).3 The manufacturing price index
Gi can be obtained by replacing (7) in the expenditure equation (3). As for P˜i, a full
specification requires choosing a functional form for ϕ(x).
Gi =
N∫
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,iϕ′−1
(
p∗,i (h) τ∗,i
P˜i
)
dh (9)
2.2 Pricing behaviour of firms
Given the demand structure for manufacturing varieties laid out above, it is possible to
work out the pricing policy of firms. As is the case in standard NEG models, it is assumed
that the production of a manufacturing variety uses only labour, with a fixed cost α and a
variable cost β. The total cost of production of a variety h in i is given by:
Ci (h) = wi
α+ β∑
j
mi,j (h)
 (10)
The profit made by a producer in region i on variety h is therefore:
pii (h) =
∑
j
pi,j (h)mi,j (h)− Ci (h) (11)
Maximising manufacturing profits with respect to all flows mi,j(h) gives the standard
Lerner index first order condition:
pi,j (h)
(
1
εi,j (h)
+ 1
)
= βwi (12)
Where the inverse price elasticity of demand is given by:
1
εi,j (h)
=
∂pi,j (h)
∂mi,j (h)
mi,j (h)
pi,j (h)
3This is shown in appendix A.2
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The formal definition of the inverse price elasticity of demand is found by taking the
derivative of pi,j(h) with respect to mi,j(h) in the first order condition (6).
1
εi,j (h)
= si,j (h)
ϕ′′ (si,j (h))
ϕ′ (si,j (h))
(13)
One can see from this equation that in the Kimball (1995) specification the mark-up
of prices on marginal costs depends on the market share si,j(h) of a variety in the target
region. One can also see that the functional form of (13) is simply the Arrow-Pratt measure
of relative risk-aversion. This is no coincidence, and is the reason why Behrens and Murata
(2007) focus their discussion on the risk aversion properties of their sub-utility functions.
The intuition behind this comes from a standard result of inter-temporal optimisation
problems. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) explain that if the overall utility function is addi-
tively separable (which is the case of the integral sum in (2)) then the Arrow-Pratt measure
of relative risk-aversion is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution.4 This is
the gist of the argument in Behrens and Murata (2007) : if the sub-utility function ϕ (x)
exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), then the elasticity of demand in (13) is also
constant, and by construction so are the mark-ups.
If one desires variable elasticities of substitution and variable mark-ups, two avenues are
possible, which both require departing from CRRA sub-utility. The first avenue, followed
by Behrens and Murata (2007), is to choose ϕ (x) such that it exhibits CARA. The second,
suggested by Kimball (1995) and the ensuing new keynesian literature, is to choose ϕ (x)
such that it exhibits variable relative risk aversion. Although these solutions both lead to
variable mark-ups, they implicity involve a tradeoff, which is discussed in the next section.
2.3 The role of the sub-utility function
The functional form chosen for the subutility function ϕ(x) in our VES-NEG model is similar
to the one suggested by Dotsey and King (2005). The various derivatives and inverses
required to work the model are given in appendix A.1.
ϕ (x) =
(ηx− (η − 1))ρ
η
− (1− η)
ρ
η
(14)
One can see from (14) that for 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < η ≤ 1, ϕ(x) is increasing, concave,
and ϕ(0) = 0, which satisfies the requirements laid out in section 2.1.
4The standard inter-temporal optimisation problems presented in chapters 2 and 6 of Blanchard and
Fischer (1989) involve summing the instantaneous utility from the consumption of a single good over con-
tinuous time. Here, the dimensions of the problem are inverted, and utility per variety is summed over a
continuum of goods at a single point in time. This means that the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
becomes an elasticity of substitution amongst varieties.
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We now turn towards discussing how this specification diverges from the CRRA - CES
standard of typical Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) models. The discussion will focus on the role
of η, which is the parameter of interest. Its role can be understood in two equivalent ways,
depending on whether one looks at the curvature or the separability properties of the demand
function. Given the specification of ϕ′−1 (x) in appendix A.1, the compensated demand for
a variety (7) can be expressed as:
mj,i (h)
Mi
=
1
η
((
pj,i (h) τj,i
ρP˜i
) 1
ρ−1
+ (η − 1)
)
As pointed out by Dotsey and King (2005), this is the sum of a CES demand and a
constant term which depends only on η. In particular, Sbordone (2007) shows that the η
parameter controls the curvature of the relative demand curve. Varying η produces a set of
demand curves with a wide range of possible curvatures, from convex to concave. Examples
of such demand curves are given in the figures of Dotsey and King (2005) and Sbordone
(2007).
Examining the separability conditions of Behrens and Murata (2007) gives a second
interpretation of the role of η. Indeed, Behrens and Murata show that when the sub-
utility function ϕ(x) exhibits CRRA, the demand function ϕ′−1(x) displays the following
multiplicative quasi-separablility (MQS) property:
ϕ′−1 (xy) = ϕ′−1 (x)× f (y)
Given the specification of ϕ′−1 (x), one can obtain the value of ϕ′−1 (xy):
ϕ′−1 (xy) = ϕ′−1 (x)× 1
η
(y)
1
ρ−1 +
(η − 1)
η
As for the previous result, this is the sum of the CRRA - CES solution and a constant
parameter which depends only on η. The particularity of the Kimball (1995) aggregator
compared to the Behrens and Murata (2007) approach, therefore, is that separability fails
to hold in general. This failure nevertheless happens in a very controlled manner: for all
values of the arguments x and y, the divergence from MQS is always constant and controlled
by η.
It should be apparent from this discussion that for the special case where η = 1, the
divergence term disappears, and the demand function exhibits MQS. This implies that the
entire model reverts to the CRRA - CES case. Additionally, specifying ρ = (σ−1)/σ recovers
the generic Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) benchmark with constant elasticity of substitution σ,
which is the standard model of NEG.
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The tradeoff mentioned in the previous section is that the VES model developed here
involves relaxing the assumption of separability, while the Behrens and Murata (2007) CARA
solution does not. The upshot, however, is that a NEG model based on the Kimball (1995)
aggregator will nest the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) benchmark as a special case (η = 1), which
is not true of the model proposed by Behrens and Murata. Indeed, the use of two entirely
different sub-utility functions means that a direct comparison of the two model predictions
is not possible. A simple illustration of this is the fact that CARA consumers become
asymptotically satiated, whereas CRRA ones do not. The Behrens and Murata CARA case
uses an exponential sub-utility of the form:
u (x) = k − κe−ax
Clearly lim
x→∞u (x) = k. The CRRA case uses a sub-utility function similar to (14)
with η = 1, and lim
x→∞ϕ (x) = ∞. This means that the underlying preference structure of
consumers is radically different, making comparisons difficult between the CES and VES
cases.
2.4 Solving for prices, quantities and mark-ups
The choice of specification for ϕ (x) allows the determination of all the price indexes de-
fined above. Starting with the compositional price index P˜i, replacing (7) into the implicit
definition of the aggregator (2) allows the definition of P˜i as a price index rather than the
initial Lagrange multiplier based definition in equation (8). The details of this are given in
appendix A.2.
P˜i =
(
N∫
0
(p∗,i (h) τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1 dh
) ρ−1
ρ
ρ (η +N (1− η)ρ)
ρ−1
ρ
(15)
Once P˜i is specified, it is possible to work out the manufacturing share in equation
(7). Additionally, one can retrieve the output flows mi,j(h) by multiplying the share (7) by
the manufacturing aggregate Mj . Using the result obtained above for P˜i and the general
specification of ϕ(x) in appendix equation (A-3), one can obtain the following:
si,j (h) = ω1
(pi,j (h) τi,j)
1
ρ−1(
N∫
0
(p∗,j (h) τ∗,j)
ρ
ρ−1 dh
) 1
ρ
+ ω2 (16)
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Here ω1 and ω2 are parameter bundles that are introduced to clarify the notation.5 Note
that ω1 = 1 and ω2 = 0 when η = 1, and so disappear from expression (16) in that case.
ω1 =
(η +N (1− η)ρ) 1ρ
η
and ω2 =
η − 1
η
Next, the manufacturing price index Gi can be calculated by inserting (16) into the
specification given by (9). As for previous results, the detailed derivation of this specification
is available in appendix A.2. Importantly, one can again see in the equation below the
confirmation that with η = 1 and ρ = (σ− 1)/σ, the price index of manufactures Gi reverts
to the typical Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) structure found in CES NEG models.
Gi = ω1
 N∫
0
(p∗,i (h) τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1 dh

ρ−1
ρ
+ ω2
 N∫
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,idh
 (17)
Finally, one can use the specification of the sub-utility function to obtain the elasticity
of demand in equation (13), and therefore the mark-up of prices over marginal costs. Given
the sub-utility function described in equation (14) and using ρ = (σ− 1)/σ, the elasticity of
demand for a variety h in a region is:
εi,j (h) = −σ
(
1− ω2
si,j (h)
)
(18)
Setting the divergence parameter η equal to one, one retrieves the standard Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) elasticity σ. This implies the following mark-up equation:
pi,j (h) =
si,j (h)− ω2
si,j (h) ρ− ω2 βwi (19)
Taking the derivative of the price with respect to the market share of a variety, one can
see that for the parameter values specified in section 2.3 (0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < η ≤ 1) there
exists a pro-competitive effect:
∂pi,j (h)
∂si,j (h)
=
ω2 (ρ− 1)
(si,j (h) ρ− ω2)2
βwi ≥ 0
If the market share of a variety in a region falls (for example because of an increase in
varieties available), the mark-up will be lower. As for the previous equations, one can see
that assuming η = 1 and ρ = (σ − 1)/σ gives the standard CES fixed mark-up Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) result. Furthermore, examination of equation (19) reveals that as for Behrens
5One can see here that ω2 is in fact the divergence term presented in the discussion on separability
in section 2.3. It therefore plays a crucial role in the model, as it controls the divergence from the CES
specification.
10
and Murata (2007) the model has a competitive limit. Indeed, one can see from (19) that:
lim
si,j(h)→0
pi,j (h) = lim
si,j(h)→0
si,j (h)− ω2
si,j (h) ρ− ω2 βwi = βwi
Thus, as the share of each variety si,j (h) tends to zero the price tends to the marginal
cost.
3 A variable elasticity of substitution NEG model
3.1 Closing the model and describing equilibrium
In order to close the proposed NEG model, factor markets need to be introduced. As is
standard in the literature and visible in equation (10), labour is the only factor, and in the
interest of simplicity, it is assumed in the following that labour cannot migrate between
regions. This is a valid assumption for both the cases examined below: it is sensible in the
autarchic case, and does not affect the properties of the free trade equilibrium, as factor
prices will be shown to equalise regardless of whether migration occurs or not. The labour
market clears in all regions, so that the the amount of labour available in each region Li
equals the sum of the input requirements in that region.
Li =
N∫
0
α+ β∑
j
mi,j (h)
 dh (20)
Within this context, an equilibrium is a set of prices pi,j(h), variety shares si,j(h), wages
wi(h) and firm masses ni(h) for which the labour markets clear and profits (11) are zero.
Proposition 1 below shows that an equilibrium will always be symmetric within regions, in
other words, that varieties produced in the same region will have the same pricing patterns
and output flows.
Proposition 1: For any two varieties h and k produced in region i, pi,j(h) = pi,j(k) =
pi,j for all transport costs τi,j. This implies that mi,j(h) = mi,j(k) = mi,j.
Proof: See appendix B.
An important aspect visible from the pricing equation (12) is that the price that a firm
will charge customers in a given region depends on the price elasticity of demand in that
region. This is not a problem in a standard CES model, as this elasticity is constant and
11
firms charge the same mill price to all consumers. In our VES model, this is not necessarily
the case as the elasticity of demand is variable. Indeed, Proposition 2 establishes that as
a general rule, unless iceberg transport costs are absent, firms cannot practice mill pricing,
and pricing to market occurs.
Proposition 2: If τi,j > 1 ∀i 6= j, firms charge different prices for different regional
flows so pi,i 6= pi,j. A mill-pricing equilibrium pi,i = pi,j is only possible if τi,j = 1 ∀i, j.
Proof: See appendix C.
Note that Proposition 2 does not investigate whether mill pricing is the only equilibrium
in the absence of transport costs. Rather, it shows that in the absence of transport costs a
mill pricing equilibrium exists. It is reasonable to assume that firms do choose mill pricing
in the when transport is costless, as all the regional markets regardless of their location
effectively become part of the local market.
3.2 The autarchic equilibrium and optimal firm mass
The autarchic equilibrium occurs when the transport costs between any two regions i and
j tend to infinity, i.e. τi,j → ∞. As is to be expected intuitively, one can see from the
price index P˜i in (15) that all varieties not produced within the region are removed from the
index. Similarly, one can see from (16) that the share variable for these varieties will reduce
to si,j = ω2. Examining the mark-up specification (19) shows that the price of these flows
will be equal to zero. The implication is that only the regional variables are important in
defining the equilibrium. Their equilibrium values are denoted with a superscript a.
From the zero profit condition (11) in region i, one can obtain the equilibrium quantities
produced within region i:
mai,i =
1
β
(
Li
nai
− α
)
(21)
Next, replacing the modified budget constraint (3) in region i, mai,i = wiLi/nipi, and
the price equation (12) into the labour market clearing condition (11), gives the following
expression for the equilibrium firm mass and elasticity of demand
nai = −
Li
αεai,i
(22)
εai,i = −σ
(
1− ω2
sai,i
)
(23)
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Next, using (16) and the definition of ω1,6, taking into account varieties not produced in
the region disappear from the integral sums, one obtains the share variable in autarchy:
sai,i =
(
η1−ρ
nai
+ (−ω2)ρ
) 1
ρ
+ ω2 (24)
As explained above, if the divergence parameter η is set to one, ω2 = 0, and the equi-
librium firm mass (22) reverts to the standard CES Dixit-Stiglitz result, nai = Li/ασ. In a
VES setting with ω2 < 0, solving explicitly for the firm mass can be difficult, as isolating nai
in equation (24) is complicated. However, Proposition 3 below show that nai,i always exists,
which means it can be solved for it numerically.
Proposition 3: In an autarchic setting, there always exists a unique firm mass nai which
is a solution to equations (22), (23) and (24).
Proof: see appendix D.
Furthermore, observing equations (22) and (23), one can immediately see that in the
VES case, with ω2 < 0, the elasticity of demand is greater in absolute value than in the
CES case and the firm mass will be lower. Figure 1 confirms this: under VES preferences,
the equilibrium number of firms is lower than under CES preferences. When entry occurs
the protection of market power offered by the increased product differentiation does not
completely offset the increased competition. This is visible through the increase in the
elasticity of demand, which reduces the mark-ups. It is therefore intuitive that less firms
survive in equilibrium compared to a situation where mark-ups remain constant.
The next step is to examine the optimality of this equilibrium. A well known result of
Dixit-Stiglitz based NEG models, pointed out by Behrens and Murata (2006) in an extension
to their basic model, is that the equilibrium number of varieties is always optimal. We show
that this is not the case with VES preferences, by showing that the the number of varieties
which maximises welfare, which we denote noi is not equal to the equilibrium n
a
i . As pointed
out in section 2.1, the manufacturing aggregate Mi is also the measure of welfare in i.
Inverting (7) gives us a specification of Mi that takes into account the resource constraint
embodied in the equilibrium quantity (21).
Mi (noi ) =
moi,i
soi,i
=
1
β
(
Li
noi
− α
)
(
η1−ρ
noi
+ (−ω2)ρ
) 1
ρ
+ ω2
(25)
6In autarchy, ω1 depends on the number of local varieties and not the overall number of varieties N . This
can be shown by recalculating P˜i for the autarchic case
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Figure 1: Equilibrium firm mass, CES vs. VES
Taking the first order condition Mi(noi ) and setting it equal to zero gives the following
expression: 7
1
noi
=
(
1
nai
+
(σ − 1) (−ω2)ρ
η1−ρ
)
soi,i
soi,i − σω2
(26)
One can see from (26) that noi = n
a
i occurs if and only if ω2 = 0, in other words if
preferences are CES. Under the VES specification developed here, with η < 1, the equi-
librium number of varieties nai is not optimal. The sign of the deviation is not clear from
(26), but numerical analysis shown in Figure 2 reveals that noi < n
a
i . This is comparable to
the findings of Behrens and Murata (2006). As they point out, the entry of an extra firm
imposes a negative externality on firms that are already in the market, through a reduction
in mark-ups. As a result of this negative externality, excess entry occurs compared to the
socially optimal level of varieties.
An important result of this analysis is that the autarchic equilibrium displays the same
qualitative properties as the autarchic CARA model developed in Behrens and Murata
(2006), in particular the existence of excess entry. As was pointed out in the previous
sections, the main difference with the CARA model of Behrens and Murata is the fact that
the Kimball aggregator nests the standard CES specification. As a result, it is much easier
to compare the predictions of the model to the benchmark.
7Details on this first order condition are given in appendix A.3
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Figure 2: Equilibrium vs. optimal firm mass
3.3 Free trade and efficiency
After analysing the autarchic equilibrium, we identify the gains from trade by investigating
the free trade free equilibrium, when there are no transport costs between regions i.e. τi,j = 1
∀i, j. As explained above, it is assumed that under these transport cost conditions, firms
choose the mill pricing equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows that this leads prices to equalise
over regions and varieties, which also implies a unique wage rate over regions.
Proposition 4: In the absence of transport costs (i.e. τi,j = 1 ∀ i, j ), there exists a
symmetric equilibrium, where across regions there is: a unique price p for all varieties, a
unique share variable s, a unique price index G and a unique wage w.
Proof: see appendix E.
Because prices and wages equalise over regions, the zero profit condition is the same for
all firms. We define L =
∑
i
Li as the overall amount of labour, and as previously, N =
∑
i
ni
is the overall firm mass. The equalisation of the share variables s implies that in free trade
firms produce the same aggregate amount over regions:
mf =
∑
j
mi,j = s
∑
j
Mj
Furthermore, one can see from equation (4) that Proposition 4 implies that per-capita
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welfare equalises over regions, so that Mi/Mj = Li/Lj . This means that any given output
flow can be worked out simply from the aggregate output and the labour share:
mi,j =
mfLj
L
∀i, j
Using this formula, the budget constraint (3) can be expressed as Nfpmf = wL. Using
this, the price equation (12), the labour market clearing condition (20) and the zero profit
equation (11) gives the following solutions for aggregate firm output and firm mass:
mf =
1
β
(
L
Nf
− α
)
(27)
nfi = −
Li
αε
(28)
Summing over regions, the total amount of varieties in free trade is therefore:
Nf =
∑
i
nfi = −
L
αε
(29)
With the unique price elasticity given by:
ε = −σ
(
1− ω2
s
)
(30)
And the following share variable:
s =
(
η1−ρ
Nf
+ (−ω2)ρ
) 1
ρ
+ ω2 (31)
Because the functional form for the system of equations (29) - (31) describing the total
number of varieties under free trade Nf is the same as (22) - (24) for nai in the autarchic
case, Proposition 3 holds. This means that this system again has a unique solution Nf .
The system can therefore be solved numerically, using exactly the same approach as for the
autarchic case.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium mass of firms as a function of the amount of labour
available, both for the CES and VES specifications. It can be read in two ways: either as
the autarchic firm mass nai given regional labour Li, or as the total free-trade firm mass
Nf given total labour L. As a result this figure illustrates the effect of free trade on the
equilibrium mass of firms in each region. For the purpose of illustration, we assume two
identical regions with an endowment of 40 units of labour. Figure 3 confirms the CES result
that firm mass ni does not change as a result of trade. For the VES model, however, the
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Figure 3: Equilibrium firm mass as a function of labour
figure shows that in autarky each region has 14 varieties while the total number of varieties
in free trade is just above 20. Given that in free trade ni = (Li/L) × N , the number
of varieties produced in each region falls, even though consumers can access more varieties
overall. This means that the smaller number of firms in each region, taking better advantage
of the increasing returns to scale exhibited by the manufacturing sector in (10).
As for the autarchic case, the equilibrium firm mass can be compared to the optimal
firm mass. Because of the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, the equations describing
the aggregate welfare under free trade are the same as the ones describing the welfare of a
region in autarky. Therefore, the following relation exists between the optimal level of firms
No and the equilibrium level of firms Nf :
1
No
=
(
1
Nf
+
(σ − 1) (−ω2)ρ
η1−ρ
)
s
s− σω2
Figure 4 replicates the analysis of Figure 2 with twice the amount of labour, completing
the illustration of free trade between two identical regions. One can see in Figure 4 that
the shortfall between No and Nf is slightly larger in absolute terms than the one displayed
for the autarky case in Figure 2. However, as for Figure 3, relative to the greater number
of regions and the larger population, one can see that free trade brings an improvement in
efficiency by bringing the overall equilibrium allocation closer to the optimal one. This is
consistent with the competitive limit on mark-ups shown in section 2.
As for the autarky benchmark, these qualitative predictions under free trade are the
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Figure 4: Equilibrium vs. optimal firm mass
same as the ones made in Behrens and Murata (2006). This is particularly true of the fact
that free trade increases the available varieties while reducing the number of local varieties,
which Behrens and Murata report as being a standard finding in the literature. However, as
for the autarky case, the VES results have the added advantage of being directly comparable
to the standard CES benchmark.
3.4 Applications
The central application suggested for this VES model is the development of extended NEG
or new trade theory models that account for pro-competitive effects and variable mark-
ups while still remaining comparable to the CES original versions. The CARA approach
suggested by Behrens and Murata (2007) has the advantage of providing a tractable method
of investigation, by retaining some form of separability in the demand function. The cost,
however, is that the closed form solutions obtained through this method are not easily
compared with the CES benchmark.
This is a crucial point, as the the empirical testing of NEG predictions is an important
issue, and most of these predictions are formulated using the CES Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
model. A rigourous approach to the empirical testing of these predictions hence requires
a theoretical model that contains the Dixit-Stiglitz structure, but accounts for the spatial
variations in market power that are bound to exist in the data. While the model developed
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here might be able do this, we argue that the Behrens and Murata (2007) model cannot,
precisely because of the lack of direct comparison with the CES benchmark.
From the specific point of view of NEG, there are therefore further empirical applications
for the VES model developed here. Indeed, as has been made clear throughout the discussion,
the transition from the CES benchmark to a VES model is controlled by the single divergence
parameter η. As explained in section 2.3, η is linked to the curvature of the demand curves,
which means that one could expect to capture it by analysing the spatial structure of local
demand structures. This would then allow for testing of core NEG predictions, controlling
for the fact that preferences diverge from the CES case by a factor η.
A promising avenue in that respect is the use of the spatial structure of firm mark-ups.
Studies such as Siotis (2003) on Spain or Konings et al. (2005) on Romania and Bulgaria
show that it is possible to use firm data to estimate average mark-ups, using the methodology
developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995). Using geo-coded firm data, this
would provide the empirical data on the spatial structure of mark-ups necessary to test within
a given country the NEG model developed here. Another related possibility is testing the
pricing to market behaviour predicted within the model using trade data between countries.
While this requires modifying the model to account for exchange rate effects, recent work
by Gust et al. (2006) shows that one can estimate a model of export pricing based on the
Kimball (1995) aggregator and identify the deviation of the demand structures from the
CES benchmark.
4 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the approach initially proposed by Behrens and Murata (2007) and
extended in Behrens and Murata (2006) to address the issue lack of pro-competitive ef-
fects in the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES setting. Although the reasons behind
the presence these fixed mark-ups in a CES setting are well explained by Behrens and Mu-
rata, the solution they suggest ignores pre-existing literature that has successfully developed
mechanisms to combine product differentiation and the pro-competitive effect of firm entry.
Furthermore we argue that while the CARA solution they advocate is technically correct,
it is also somewhat unsatisfactory. The following arguments are probably valid for most
applications of monopolistically competitive models, but particularly so for NEG, a field
practically entirely grounded on the Dixit-Stiglitz CES model.
Both the Behrens and Murata (2007) approach and the one suggested here generate
variable mark-ups, with a competitive limit. Both exhibit an equilibrium number of varieties
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that is above the optimal level, with this disparity being reduced under free trade. In order
to do so, however, the Behrens and Murata CARA model requires an entirely different sub-
utility function, while the Kimball (1995) approach only requires a change in parameter
within the same sub-utility structure. This implies that the CARA and CRRA models in
Behrens and Murata (2007) are not directly comparable. By contrast, the fact that the
Kimball (1995) aggregator encompasses both cases within the same structure makes it a
more general approach, which we suggest can be of major interest in attempting to assess
empirically the predictions of the standard CES models of NEG.
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A Mathematical appendix
A.1 Sub-utility function
Given the chosen specification for the sub-utility function (14), the following specifications
are used in the determination of the model.
First derivative: ϕ′ (x) > 0 for 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < η ≤ 1
ϕ′ (x) = ρ (ηx− (η − 1))ρ−1 (A-1)
Second derivative: ϕ′′ (x) < 0 for 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 < η ≤ 1
ϕ′′ (x) = ηρ (ρ− 1) (ηx− (η − 1))ρ−2 (A-2)
Inverse of the first derivative:
ϕ′−1 (x) =
1
η
((
x
ρ
) 1
ρ−1
+ (η − 1)
)
(A-3)
A.2 Price indexes
The compositional index P˜i of the Kimball (1995) flexible variety aggregator is initially
defined simply as a modification of the Lagrange multiplier in (8). By re-inserting the first
order condition (7) into (2) which implicity defines Mi, one can show that P˜i is indeed a
price index.
N∫
0
ϕ
(
ϕ′−1
(
p∗,i (h) τ∗,i
P˜i
))
dh = 1 (A-4)
Given the specifications of ϕ (x) given in (14) and (A-3), one can work out the integral
in the previous equation.
N∫
0
(
p∗,i (h) τ∗,i
P˜i
) ρ
ρ−1
dh = ρ
ρ
ρ−1 (η +N (1− η)ρ)
P˜i =
(
N∫
0
(p∗,i (h) τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1 dh
) ρ−1
ρ
ρ (η +N (1− η)ρ)
ρ−1
ρ
(A-5)
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From this, one can obtain for each variety the p∗,i(h)τ∗,i/P˜i ratio, which can then be used
to determine manufacturing price index Gi. This ratio can be used to derive the specification
of Gi, given in equation (9) in terms of ϕ (x) and the price to price index ratio defined above.
Gi =
∫ N
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,iϕ′−1
(
p∗,i (h) τ∗,i
P˜i
)
dh
The p∗,i(h)τ∗,i/P˜i price ratio and the functional form of ϕ′−1 in (A-3) can be used to
replace the ϕ′−1(p∗,i(h)τ∗,i/P˜i) notation. Factoring the constant terms out of the integral
sum and rearranging gives the specification of the manufacturing price index. One can see
that setting η = 1 not only results in the standard Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) CES price index
for Gi, but also for the compositional price index P˜i in (A-5).
Gi =
(η +N (1− η)ρ) 1ρ
η
 N∫
0
(p∗,i (h) τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1 dh

ρ 1
ρ
+
η − 1
η
∫ N
0
p∗,i (h) τ∗,idh (A-6)
A.3 Optimal firm mass
Equation (25) gives the welfare as a function of firm mass Mi(ni) = mi,i/si,i. The socially
optimal number of firms, noi , is given by the first order condition on welfare dMi(n
o
i )/dn
o
i = 0.
dMi (noi )
dnoi
=
dmoi,i
dnoi
soi,i − ds
o
i,i
dnoi
moi,i(
soi,i
)2 = 0
Given the specification of mi,i in (21) and si,i in (24), the first order condition is:
(
−Lisoi,i +
η1−ρ
ρ
(
Li
noi
− α
)(
η1−ρ
noi
+ (−ω2)ρ
) 1−ρ
ρ
)
1
β (noi )
2 (
soi,i
)2 = 0
The zero value in the first order condition must come from the term in brackets. Rear-
ranging this term by isolating noi on the left hand side gives
1
noi
=
α
Li
+
ρsoi,i
η1−ρ
(
soi,i − ω2
)1−ρ
Introducing ρ = (σ − 1)/σ and the definition of the elasticity of demand in (18):
1
noi
=
α
Li
− σ − 1
εoi,iη
1−ρ
(
soi,i − ω2
)ρ
Using to the definition of the share variable (24) to substitute the (soi,i − ω2)ρ term:
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1
noi
=
α
Li
− σ − 1
εoi,iη
1−ρ
(
η1−ρ
noi
+ (−ω2)ρ
)
Finally, solving for 1/noi gives:
1
noi
=
(−αεoi,i
Li
+
(σ − 1) (−ω2)ρ
η1−ρ
)
1
1− (εoi,i + σ)
Using (22) to introduce nai and (23) to substitute for the elasticity ε
a
i,i in the denominator
of the right hand side the gives the specification used in section 3.2.
B Proof of Proposition 1 (Symmetric pricing of regional
varieties)
Proposition 1: For any two varieties h and k produced in region i, pi,j(h) = pi,j(k) = pi,j
for all transport costs τi,j
Proof:
Combining the first order conditions for profit maximisation for the varieties h and k
(12) and the definition of the inverse elasticity of demand (13) gives :
 pi,j (h)
(
si,j (h)
ϕ′′(si,j(h))
ϕ′(si,j(h))
+ 1
)
= βwi
pi,j (k)
(
si,j (k)
ϕ′′(si,j(k))
ϕ′(si,j(k))
+ 1
)
= βwi
(A-7)
With
 si,j (h) = ϕ
′−1
(
pi,j(h)τi,j
P˜j
)
si,j (k) = ϕ′−1
(
pi,j(k)τi,j
P˜j
) (A-8)
The right hand side of the conditions in (A-7) are equal, so the following must hold:
pi,j (h)
(
si,j (h)
ϕ′′ (si,j (h))
ϕ′ (si,j (h))
+ 1
)
= pi,j (k)
(
si,j (k)
ϕ′′ (si,j (k))
ϕ′ (si,j (k))
+ 1
)
(A-9)
Furthermore, both the compositional price index P˜j and transport costs τi,j are given
to the producers of varieties h and k in region i. Therefore, the left hand side of (A-9) is a
function of pi,j(h) only, and the right hand side is the same function of pi,j(k) only. Relation
(A-9) can only hold if pi,j(h) = pi,j(k). This implies that in (A-8) si,j(h) = si,j(k), and
from the definition of si,j(h) in (7), one infers mi,j(h) = mi,j(k). ¥
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C Proof of Proposition 2 (Pricing to market)
Proposition 2: If τi,j > 1 ∀i 6= j, firms charge different prices for different regional flows
so pi,i 6= pi,j. A mill-pricing equilibrium pi,i = pi,j is only possible if τi,j = 1 ∀i, j.
Proof:
From the first order condition (12) one can see that for firms to charge the same price to
all regions requires that the elasticity of demand for that variety to be equal over regions.
From the specification of elasticities in (13), this also implies equalisation of the shares:
pi,i = pi,j ⇔ εi,i = εi,j ⇔ si,i = si,j
Assume that firms choose mill pricing pi,j = pi,i, so that the share variables (16) can be
expressed solely in terms of the prices charged in the region of production:

si,i = ω1
(pi,i)
1
ρ−1∑
∗
(
n∗(p∗,∗)
ρ
ρ−1 (τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ
+ ω2
si,j = ω1
(pi,i)
1
ρ−1 (τi,j)
1
ρ−1∑
∗
(
n∗(p∗,∗)
ρ
ρ−1 (τ∗,j)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ
+ ω2
(A-10)
There are three possible cases depending on the value of transport costs τ :
1. In general for all origin regions shipping costs equalise for all target regions τ∗,i = τ∗,j .
Because the home region is also a target region and by definition τi,i = 1, this implies
τi,j = 1 ∀i, j. Then the numerators and denominators in (A-10) equalise, and si,i =
si,j . This supports the mill-pricing equilibrium.
2. The transport cost structure is such that varying values of the numerators in (A-10)
are compensated exactly by the denominators, ensuring si,i = si,j . From (A-10), with
weights Ω∗ = n∗(p∗,∗)
ρ
ρ−1 , the following condition must hold:
1∑
∗
(
Ω∗ (τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ
=
(τi,j)
1
ρ−1∑
∗
(
Ω∗ (τ∗,j)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ
(A-11)
3. In general, transport costs to different target regions are not equal, but the structure
does not satisfy (A-11). Then shares si,i and si,j do not equalise, so it cannot be true
that pi,i = pi,j .
While case 2 is mathematically feasible, the transport cost structure required to satisfy
(A-11) violates the economic assumptions on transport costs. Rearranging (A-11) gives:
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τi,j =

∑
∗
(
Ω∗ (τ∗,j)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ
∑
∗
(
Ω∗ (τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ

ρ−1
Replicating (A-10) for sj,j and sj,i gives the equivalent condition (A-11) for transport
cost τj,i:
τj,i =

∑
∗
(
Ω∗ (τ∗,i)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ
∑
∗
(
Ω∗ (τ∗,j)
ρ
ρ−1
) 1
ρ

ρ−1
=
1
τi,j
Under case 2, for any flow i → j subject to iceberg transport costs τi,j ≥ 1, the reverse
flow has costs τi,j ≤ 1, which violates the iceberg cost assumptions that τi,j ≥ 1 ∀i, j. Only
if τi,j = 1 can case 2 give an acceptable outcome, but that is already covered by case 1.
Therefore, unless τi,j = 1 ∀i, j, one cannot have pi,i = pi,j . ¥
D Proof of Proposition 3 (Autarchic equilibrium)
Proposition 3: In an autarchic setting, there always exists a firm mass nai which is a
solution to equations (22), (23) and (24).
Proof:
Inverting (22) gives the following system of equations (In order to distinguish the two
equations, subscripts 1 and 2 replace i, i ):
 ε
a
1 = − Liαnai
εa2 = −σ
(
1− ω2sai,i
) (A-12)
With
sai,i =
(
η1−ρ
nai
+ (−ω2)ρ
) 1
ρ
+ ω2 (A-13)
First of all, the following is true:
lim
nai→0
εa1 (n
a
i ) = −∞ < lim
nai→0
εa2 (n
a
i ) = −σ
and
lim
nai→∞
εa1 (n
a
i ) = 0 > lim
nai→∞
εa2 (n
a
i ) = −∞
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Functions εa1(n
a
i ) and ε
a
2(n
a
i ) have the same domain, are continuous, and intersect at least
once on their co-domains. Therefore, there exists at least one nai which equalises ε
a
1(n
a
i ) and
εa2(n
a
i ) and solves the system.
Taking the first derivative of εa1(n
a
i ) gives:
dεa1
dni,a
=
Li
α (nai )
2 > 0
Taking the first derivative of εa2(n
a
i ), using the chain rule on s
a
i,i, gives:
dεa2
dnai,i
= − ω2
σ
(
sai,i
)2 η1−ρ
ρ
(
nai,i
)2
(
η1−ρ
nai,i
+ (−ω2)ρ
) 1−ρ
ρ
< 0
Both εa1(n
a
i ) and ε
a
2(n
a
i ) are strictly monotonic. Therefore, n
a
i is unique. ¥
E Proof of Proposition 4 (Symmetric equilibrium)
Proposition 4: In the absence of transport costs (i.e. τi,j = 1 ∀ i, j ), there exists a
symmetric equilibrium, where across regions there is: a unique price p for all varieties, a
unique share variable s, a unique price index G and a unique wage w.
Proof:
Proposition 2 establishes that under free trade, where τi,j = 1 ∀ i, j, mill pricing pi,i =
pi,j = pi is supported by the elasticity of demand, which implies:
pi,i = pi,j ⇔ εi,i = εi,j ⇔ si,i = si,j
The share variables for production flows originating in region i are given by:
 si,i = ϕ
′−1
(
pi,i
P˜i
)
si,j = ϕ′−1
(
pi,j
P˜j
) (A-14)
Given that if pi,i = pi,j = pi ∀ i, j then si,i = si,j = si ∀ i, j , it follows from (A-14) that
the compositional price index in region i and j also equalise such that P˜i = P˜j = P˜ ∀ i, j.
Equation (9) gives the manufacturing price index G in regions i and j:

Gi =
N∫
0
p∗,iϕ′−1
(
p∗,i
P˜i
)
dh
Gj =
N∫
0
p∗,jϕ′−1
(
p∗,j
P˜j
)
dh
(A-15)
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As for the share variables in (A-14), if pi,i = pi,j = pi ∀ i, j, then P˜i = P˜j = P˜ ∀ i, j
and it follows from (A-15) that Gi = Gj = G ∀ i, j. Therefore, under mill pricing the price
indexes equalise over regions:
pi,i = pi,j = pi ∀ i, j ⇔ P˜i = P˜j = P˜ and Gi = Gj = G
Taking into account that mill pricing equalises a variety’s price across regions, pi,i =
pi,j = pi, which implies si,i = si,j = si, the first order conditions for profit maximisation in
regions i and j can be written as:
 pi
(
si
ϕ′′(si)
ϕ′(si)
+ 1
)
= βwi
pj
(
sj
ϕ′′(sj)
ϕ′(sj)
+ 1
)
= βwj
(A-16)
One can see from (A-16) that if the mill price of a variety is the same in each region,
pi = pj , then wgaes must also be equal across regions, so wi = wj .
pi = pj ⇔ wi = wj
It remains to show that either pi = pj or wi = wj occur under free trade. Taking into
the mill-pricing behaviour of firms in free trade, equation (11) can be used to determine the
profit made by the representative firm in any two regions i and j:

pii = pi
∑
j
mi,j − wi
(
α+ β
∑
j
mi,j
)
pij = pj
∑
i
mj,i − wj
(
α+ β
∑
i
mj,i
) (A-17)
The individual output flow towards a target region j, mi,j , is given by equation (7).
Combined with the equalisation of shares implied by mill pricing, this gives:
mi,j = siMj (A-18)
These can be replacing into the profit equations (A-17). Taking into account the fact
that firm entry ensures zero profits and rearranging gives:

∑
j
Mj = αwisi(pi−βwi)∑
i
Mi =
αwj
sj(pj−βwj)
(A-19)
The left hand side of these expressions is the same, as summing the manufacturing aggre-
gate over regions gives the same result regardless of the nature of the indexing. Equalising
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the right hand sides gives:
αwi
si (pi − βwi) =
αwj
sj (pj − βwj) (A-20)
The equalisation of price indices mean that equation (A-14) can be expressed as si =
ϕ′−1(pi/P˜ ). The share for a variety produced in i is therefore a function of the regional price
pi only, so that si = s(pi). Therefore, it follows from equation (A-16) that for all regions i,
the wages are also a function of the regional price pi only, so that wi = w(pi). Inserting this
in (A-20) gives the following relation:
αw (pi)
s (pi) (pi − βw (pi)) =
αw (pj)
s (pj) (pj − βw (pj)) (A-21)
For this relation to hold requires pi = pj . Therefore regional manufacturing and factor
prices equalise. ¥
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